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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to compare the cost and time-to-reliably-replenish  
constraints of commercial and military modes of shipment to the main three annual joint 
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) exercises conducted in three distinct allied 
countries. This study also estimates potential cost savings if commercial shipment 
becomes the primary means. Using a business case analysis, we compare the estimated 
costs of current methods for providing logistical support in USPACOM, and provide 
recommendations to improve the system.   
The utilization of commercial companies as the primary means of shipment of 
aircraft parts in USPACOM is a national and military strategic imperative. Specifically, 
the current costs of operating KC-130J aircraft as primary means of shipment far exceeds 
costs if the primary mode of shipment became commercial agencies. Equally important is 
improving upon joint multi-national relationships and joint logistics best business 
practices that would facilitate optimal asset throughput in the Customs Departments of 
our allied nations.  
In considering and analyzing the above dynamics, this study will provide a cost 
based analysis and qualitative evaluation regarding the use of commercial agencies 
and/or United States Marine Corps KC-130J heavy-lift aircraft in the shipment of F/A-18 
aircraft parts within the USPACOM Area of Responsibility.   
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A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study provides a cost-based analysis and qualitative evaluation regarding the 
use of commercial agencies (i.e., FedEx and DHL) or the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
KC-130J heavy-lift transport aircraft in the shipment of F/A-18 aircraft parts within the 
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) of 
Southeast Asia, to include Australia. As stated in the 2011 National Military Strategy of 
the U.S., “as our presence and alliance commitments remain the key to preserving 
stability in Northeast Asia, we must also invest new attention and resources in Southeast 
and South Asia” (Mullen, National Military Strategy, 2011, p. 1). The U.S. national 
military strategy is not only focused on building upon a strong presence in the 
USPACOM AOR, but, in considering the current global economic recession, the U.S. 
military leadership is focused on sustaining a strong presence in the most efficient 
manner possible while concurrently increasing effectiveness. Increased effectiveness 
would result in increased mission capable (MC) readiness of F/A-18 aircraft in the 
region, and, hence, lower time-to-reliably-replenish (TRR) rates, while increased 
efficiency implies decreases in cost to ship aircraft parts to joint exercise locations in 
foreign countries, both complementing each other and satisfying U.S. strategic objectives. 
The research provided the opportunity to travel to a few key JUSMAGs and supporting 
General Services Offices (GSO) where we observed the current standard operating 
procedures (SOP), spoke with the host-country and U.S. military leadership, and gained 
perspective that significantly contributes to the validity of this project. 
The purpose of this study is to examine and compare the cost and TRR constraints 
of commercial and military modes of shipment to three (of 13) annual joint USPACOM 
exercises conducted in three distinct allied countries, as well as estimate potential cost 
savings if commercial shipment were to become the primary or sole mode of shipment of 
aircraft parts. This study, furthermore, conducts a business case analysis (BCA) 
comparing the estimated costs of current methods that provide logistical support in 
USPACOM, and provides recommendations to improve the logistics system as a whole. 
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We identify and describe the costs associated with shipping by either method, referencing 
the international commercial carrier cost, and the cost to operate, man, and maintain 
military aircraft. We additionally identify and describe the TRR constraints of each 
method through push-pull methodologies that elaborate on the complexities of the 
USPACOM hybrid supply chain system, the time to deliver an item from Japan to 
another Southeast Asia country if shipped via commercial carrier, and planning lead-time 
of how long it takes to deliver an item from Japan to another Southeast Asian country if 
shipped via military air.  
The balance of our report is a historical analysis using data available for the 
previous three years spanning 2008–2011. We explore USMC demand trends for each 
Unit Deployment Program (UDP) flying squadron for each joint USPACOM exercise 
from 2008–2011. We also analyze delivery trends of commercial carriers and USMC 
KC-130J military heavy-lift transport aircraft for each USPACOM exercise from 2008–
2011. At the same time, we examine diplomatic influence strategies employed by the 
U.S. specific to the U.S. military joint leadership at each respective JUSMAG and host-
country customs department. Finally, we conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis 
to simulate, forecast, and develop a cost estimate for employing either commercial 
carriers or military air transport in the near/distant future. Based on the results of the 
simulation and forecast, we recommend the most efficient and effective means to 
optimize logistical support U.S. UDP flying squadrons during joint PACOM exercises in 
the most optimal manner. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is continuing pressure for the Department of Defense (DoD) to cut costs 
and contribute to reducing the national debt. The fiscal year (FY) 2012 president’s budget 
requests $670.9 billion for the DoD, including $553.1 billion in base funds and 
$117.8 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds. This is a decrease of 
$37.3 billion from FY 2011 and will require further scrutiny and management of program 
acquisitions to ensure that only the best programs are funded (DoD, 2011). How do you 
efficiently and effectively implement cut-backs or change in an organization like the DoD 
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that, unlike the whole of the U.S. government, does not currently answer to a system of 
“checks and balances” and is, therefore, not auditable?  Answering this question becomes 
a very difficult task where the answer may be unpopular and not in the best interest of a 
nation striving to remain free and secure in the onset of a fiscally constrained global 
environment in the near and distant future. 
The DoD’s audit policy has a trickle-down effect on the subcomponents of the 
DoD and/or State Department. Since there are not official checks and balances in place at 
the highest level, why would there be at lower levels (i.e., JUSMAGs)?  For example, 
JUSMAGs, and MALS-12 specifically, are operational and tactical agencies, 
respectively, whose effectiveness/efficiency have strategic implications in times of peace 
and war. How do DoD operational entities become more efficient and effective if they are 
untouchable from outside business practice scrutiny or audits?  MALS-12 is subject to 
external scrutiny, and must meet the highest of aviation safety standards in order to help 
ensure all F/A-18 aircraft in the Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) are safe-for-flight 
(SFF) at all times. MALS-12 functionality is, therefore, highly transparent to all higher 
headquarters and falls under the direction of the Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) 
umbrella for proper and efficient maintenance and optimal readiness practices. However, 
overseas DoD organizations like the JUSMAGs do not. The DoD as a whole is coming 
under more and more fire for its “unauditability,” and for good reason, for if there were a 
full-scale conflict involving the U.S. (with USPACOM allies engaged as well) mounted 
against a USPACOM foe, the logistics ineffectiveness within the JUSMAG organizations 
and host-country customs departments would surely become the most significant allied 
constraint. It is, again, a national and strategic imperative that joint effectiveness and 
relationships improve in Southeast Asian countries in order to support logistics 
throughput in a time of a conflict with China or other adversaries in the region.   
Rapid allied FFP is, fortunately, still a reality today, even considering the current 
logistical and diplomatic hurdles that evade optimal efficiency and effectiveness. The 
U.S. diplomatic and global economic influence scale still greatly favors the U.S. and its 
allies in the region, but the United States may be slowly moving out of favor in some of 
those countries we intend to continue to protect and support. This paradigm is best 
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summarized by the Commanding Officer of the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in 
Guam, Marianas (P. M. Tucker, personal communication, June 4, 2012): 
The policy makers in the State Department are rattled by DoD strong 
arming for military execution. These [USPACOM-allied countries] are 
relationships where we want them to need us instead of resorting to 
Chinese influence, so it’s tenuous. Because our other elements of [U.S.] 
national power are so weakened, it’s like being a guest that feels that he’s 
worn out his welcome as he arrives. 
So how does the U.S. sustain regional security that is vital to U.S. national 
interests while helping those that may not want help, but are forced to tolerate the U.S. 
presence because of the imminent threat of another Asian country (i.e., choosing the 
better of two “evils”)?  What is the better of two “evils,” China or the U.S.?  According 
to current posturing in the region, most Asian countries still, to a great degree, trust and 
favor the known U.S. presence over the unknown, and rapidly expanding, Chinese 
prevalence in Asia. Specifically, amid tensions in the region, and consistent with U.S. 
national and strategic objectives projected for next 10 years, the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, Leon Panetta, flew to Vietnam (Figure 1) on June 4, 2012, to discuss strategy 
and the threats of bordering countries, specifically, China. The bottom line is that 
Vietnam wants protection from Chinese aggression; so do other allies.   
 
Figure 1.  Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta Greets  
    Vietnam Military Leadership (04 June 2012) 
Enter the extreme and imminent challenge of planning for, and implementing, 
efficient and effective logistics operations in order to sustain a potential military conflict 
against China, and/or other enemies in the region. A strategic imperative is, yet again, to 
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continue to diligently attempt to influence new commercial contracts in cohort with host-
country allies in order to best prepare for conflict. 
Since it has been widely publicized that the U.S. national and strategic focus is 
currently shifting to the USPACOM AOR, then joint operational training and 
expectations must increase significantly in order to achieve national strategic objectives. 
The military tactical units are not capable of organically sustaining the movement of their 
own gear/parts in an efficient and fast enough timeframe in time of conflict. Specifically, 
using VMGR-152 (Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152—the sole USMC 
KC-130J troop/gear transport squadron in USPACOM) as an example, their mission to 
support the movement and sustainment of USMC units would be inadequate, 
overburdened, and cumbersome if joint action were taken against China or other 
adversaries. 
It is, ultimately, unrealistic to expect that one KC-130J squadron consisting of 
12 aircraft could sustain not only the movement and posturing of thousands of Marines in 
the region in a time of conflict, but even more daunting is the expectation of this 
squadron providing parts replenishment operations for NMC F/A-18 aircraft wherever the 
aircraft may be NMCS, for example, the small isolated country of Brunei where aircraft 
have been known to divert in times of an in-flight maintenance emergency.   
Considering the current military and national strategic shift to USPACOM, 
emphasis must quickly shift to focus on joint commercial or government contracts (i.e., 
SOFAs) that better facilitate optimal and seamless movement of commercial parts 
through the customs departments of all allied Southeast and Southern Asian countries. 
This not only could become the most effective means of parts replenishment—as will be 
covered later—but, more important, and considering the current global recession and 
fiscal constraints, is the more efficient alternative to providing logistical support. The 
U.S. needs to save money and examining very closely DoD business practices is a good 
place to start. As will be discussed in the next, options are available, and due diligence 
from contract writers and negotiators could achieve the economic and strategic ends 
necessary to achieve U.S. national and military strategic objectives while saving the 
United States a large sum of money. 
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Life-cycle costs are one of the most important measures in determining whether 
or not to pursue implementation of new logistics processes or international contracts in 
order to justify discontinuing current methods. If performance of current sustainment 
priorities cannot justify costs—as is the case for KC-130J in the movement of aircraft 
parts—then emphasis on military modes of shipment should be significantly decreased. 
Whereas the increased emphasis on the use of agencies, such as FedEx and DHL, will not 
completely replace the total mission and necessity of military airlift, they can serve as an 
extremely viable cost “force multiplier” that significantly contributes to the potential for 
an exponential amount of cost savings for the DoD in the short and long run. 
Concurrently, increased aircraft readiness will be realized as well, for the parts 
will arrive days sooner if the customs obstacle is permanently understood and overcome. 
The best alternative to become more efficient and achieve cost savings and increased 
effectiveness, is for the DoD, and hence U.S. operational- and tactical-level units, to be 
provided greater opportunity to ship by commercial means. In turn, this alternative will 
result in less emphasis on MilAir transport (avoiding extreme O&M costs of KC-130J 
aircraft), and rely more heavily on the capability of commercial carriers through the DoS 
and DoD to remain vigilant under pressure and to apply attention to the fluidity and 
business practices of their own host-country customs departments. The degree of joint 
fluidity of all allied customs departments determines a large portion of the life-cycle costs 
(AWP fiscal constraints) as well as the potential level of heightened aircraft readiness 
essential to satisfy the United States’ new national strategic objectives in the volatile 
USPACOM region. 
1. The High Cost of Current Asset Replenishment in USPACOM 
Current F/A-18 aircraft part replenishment costs to allied countries within the 
USPACOM AO is dependent upon the number of aircraft forward deployed at an 
exercise site in an allied country, how far away that country is from the supply warehouse 
on Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Iwakuni, Japan, the demand frequency of parts for 
non-mission capable (NMC) aircraft, the level of local support typically experienced at a 
the host-country embark location, and finally and most importantly, VMGR-152 mission 
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priorities planned to be accomplished before, or concurrent to, F/A-18 parts 
replenishment requirements in other USPACOM countries. Many different missions are 
planned for the following day, and those that shift/arise on a daily basis for VMGR-152. 
Parts replenishment is just one cog in their large wheel representing their many mission 
sets and operational and tactical capabilities. Keeping this in mind (as well as the 
extremely high O&M costs of these aircraft), as well as the U.S. national and military 
strategic objectives recently re-focusing on Southeast Asia, it is imperative to keep the 
relatively small number of F/A-18 aircraft in the region at optimal readiness levels, and to 
apply other alternatives and means to do so. It is a U.S. national and strategic imperative 
that the U.S. joint forces employ more use of commercial private carriers and at the same 
time learn how to significantly lessen the time commercially shipped items spend in each 
allied country’s customs departments. The many mission challenges and priorities 
alluded to previously are often times shifted for the highest priority, which is to re-route 
KC-130Js—with replenishment part(s)—to the Southeast Asian country where an NMCS 
F/A-18 is in need. The aforementioned priority shift is often times justified for reasons of 
effectiveness and not for the cost efficiencies that could be realized if aircraft parts were 
sent commercially and customs was a smooth, quick process. 
VMGR-152 is the sole USMC KC-130 squadron supporting Marine forces in the 
Pacific. These 12 large and unique heavy-lift transport aircraft are charged with 
“supporting the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander by providing 
aerial refueling and assault support, day or night under all weather conditions during 
expeditionary, joint, or combined operations” (www.marines.mil). Flight data for each 
leg of flight is recorded and tracked via the Marine-Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness 
Program (MSHARP). Each leg of each flight is documented, and the contents and 
purpose of each flight are captured within the system. Provided on page 51 is a snapshot 
of the total poundage and frequency of cargo moved from 2008–2011. VMGR-152’s 
troop/gear transport is critical to FFP and stability in the USPACOM region. Its mission 
is overburdened by the insurmountable number of tasks the unit is charged with 
achieving on any given day. This is where commercial shipping agencies can serve as a  
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huge compliment to this tactical unit, specifically, and significantly decrease their 
workload by taking the lead on the shipment of all F/A-18 aircraft parts that need to reach 
a foreign destination quickly and efficiently. 
The majority of all F/A-18 parts are currently sent from the MALS-12 warehouse 
via a VMGR-152 KC-130J aircraft. Too few are sent via commercial carriers if the 
availability of the Super Hercules aircraft is limited. Each of these variables alone plays a 
major role in the cost of replenishment processes. It goes without saying that USMC KC-
130J aircraft are very expensive to operate and maintain. Specifically, on average, the 
cost to the U.S. taxpayer is about 10 times more to ship an aircraft part via KC-130J 
roundtrip to Khorat, Thailand (the location of Joint Exercise Cobra Gold), than the cost to 
ship the same part via commercial means. As will be displayed in a later chapter, the cost 
to employ a commercial agency is far less than the O&M costs of military aircraft. 
C. LOGISTICS 
As is the case in any major conflict, operational needs drive all facets of support. 
Logistics and an effective supply chain are major enablers in the USPACOM region. 
Simply stated, the only way to render proper support to forward locations is to have a 
supply chain that is constantly evolving in response to changing conditions and threats. 
Conditions and threats are changing in Asia. With the withdrawal of forces from 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and according to the National Security Strategy of 
2011, “we [the U.S.] have taken substantial steps to deepen our engagement in the region, 
through regional organizations, new dialogues, and high-level diplomacy… [to] expand 
our military security cooperation, exchanges,  and exercises with the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia … and Australia” (Mullen, 2011). The renewed strategic 
emphasis on the aforementioned countries and Asia as a whole implies a strategic 
imperative to improve all processes and relationships to obtain optimal levels in order to 
counter known threats in the region. 
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D. LOGISTICAL DELIVERY METHODS 
Organic to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1MAW) headquartered in Okinawa, 
Japan, three main cargo delivery capabilities currently support units on MCAS Iwakuni, 
Japan,  and each arranges and delivers parts to Southeast and South Asian countries for 
annual joint exercises:  
 USMC KC-130J heavy-lift troop transport aircraft, 
 U.S. Navy or Air Force C-40A heavy-lift transport aircraft, and  
 Commercial carrier shipment via FedEx or DHL. 
These capabilities can be combined to resupply detached F/A-18 units, but do not 
typically complement each other very well. In this study, we focus on the USMC VMGR-
152 (KC-130Js) and commercial modes to investigate the best alternative as a means of 
replenishment. 
E. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
In this study, we investigate the joint, regional, and operational conditions 
needed/required for effective and efficient employment of commercial logistics agencies.  
In our analysis, we dissect the distance between each logistical leg of the journey 
for commercial and MilAir shipment, total replenishment costs, the platform/agency 
providing support, and the TRR for each method. We describe the scenario in detail in 
Chapter III. 
F. MBA PROJECT SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
Our primary purpose is to analyze the cost and capability of commercial shipment 
against the cost and capability of MilAir transport. Our analysis indicates if and where 
shipping parts commercially can be of greater benefit to the end user (F/A-18 flying 
squadron) and the DoD’s checkbook. Furthermore, in this project we discuss how the 
development and/or redressing of current logistics joint contracts in USPACOM can 
impact and likely significantly benefit the Marines and other tactical units serving in 
unique conditions in all of Asia. Ultimately, achieving U.S. national and military strategic 
objectives in USPACOM comes through realizing increased readiness by using the most 
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efficient (commercial) and effective (overcoming customs hurdles) means. U.S. joint 
logistics means must become significantly cheaper; however, effectiveness should not be 
sacrificed in the process. In subsequent chapters, we look at the history, current trends, 
and potential for logistical efficiency and effectiveness never realized, but critical to 
satisfying U.S. objectives in the near future. 
This project is organized into eight chapters: Chapter I—Introduction, Chapter 
II—Background, Chapter III—Business Case Analysis (BCA), Chapter IV—BCA 
Methodology, Chapter V—Operational and Strategic Scenarios, Chapter VI—Supply 




In this chapter, we outline the history and context of the exercises in the 
USPACOM that currently rely on the logistic support methods discussed in Chapter IV. 
Understanding historical relevance of logistics in the modern era is important in reference 
to understanding the design and structure of current logistics policies and procedures that 
hinder and/or facilitate logistics efficiency and effectiveness today.  
A. OVERVIEW/HISTORY 
Since the inception of forward flight, and its subsequent integration in the 
execution of a war, logistics efficiency has habitually been sacrificed for effectiveness. 
All that has ever mattered to the United States when planning and engaged during World 
War II, the Korean War, Desert Storm, and, in more recent years, the Global War on 
Terrorism was how quickly and effectively bombs could be dropped on target to ensure 
quick and decisive victory to win a battle and/or war. Pennies were seldom counted for 
the logistical costs of war because the security of our nation was perceived to be in 
jeopardy and, therefore, securing freedom outweighed fiscal consequences. Fortunately, 
times have changed, more resources are available, and the United States and its allies are 
ever more willing to work together in USPACOM specifically, toward continuous 
process improvement in logistics best practices in order to achieve optimal joint forward 
force projection. Joint negotiations at the tactical level can now achieve maximum 
logistical efficiency and effectiveness without either principle being sacrificed, primarily 
through the increased employment of private commercial carriers (i.e., FedEx and/or 
DHL).   
The USMC and allied forces within USPACOM share a partnership of providing 
regional security to a vast area of approximately 30,000 square miles of land and sea—
about 51% of the Earth’s mass. With the ongoing withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, “renewed emphasis has been focused on the implications and potential 
ramifications of rebalancing and realigning U.S. military forces toward the Asian Pacific 
region” (Wise, Warfighting Lab, “Way Ahead,” 2012, p. 3). How will reemphasizing our 
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existing alliance and logistical capabilities in this region impact USPACOM strategy?  
And, how do the strategic intentions of China and North Korea fit in the United States’ 
declared “pivotal shift” following OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?  These 
questions address strategic uncertainty in a region where at least one thing is for certain, 
there are highly capable and efficient “game-changing” commercial logistics agencies 
firmly established and now available that can move aircraft parts faster and cheaper than 
any military organization or other private company. 
B. CONCEPT OF EXERCISES IN USPACOM 
USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. government 
agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and 
partners, USPACOM leadership is charged with enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, 
responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. 
This approach is based on U.S. partnership, presence, and military readiness in the 
region. Stability enhancement and engaged and trusted partnerships are facilitated 
through the execution of annual joint exercises in the USPACOM AOR, as portrayed in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  USPACOM Regional Map (From USPACOM, 2012) 
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C. DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISES 
USPACOM participates in many exercises and other engagement activities with 
foreign military forces.  
Four of the major exercises and countries include the following: 
1. TALISMAN SABER/SOUTHERN FRONTIER (TS-SF). A biennial 
Australia/United States bilateral exercise(s) merging the following 
exercises: TANDEM THRUST, KINGFISHER, and CROCODILE. TS-
SF is the primary training venue for Commander Seventh Fleet as a 
Combined Task Force (CTF) in a short-warning, power-projection, 
forcible-entry scenario. The exercise is a key opportunity to train 
Australian and U.S. combined forces in mid- to high-intensity combat 
operations using training areas in Australia. 
2. COBRA GOLD (CG). A joint/combined exercise with Thailand designed 
to improve U.S./Thai combat readiness and joint/combined 
interoperability. 
3. BALIKATAN/PHIBLEX. A joint exercise with the Republic of the 
Philippines and the U.S. to improve combat readiness and interoperability. 
The purpose of this exercise is to conduct bilateral training between the 
two military forces to maintain readiness, improve interoperability, and 
sustain the long-term security cooperation relationship shared between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States. 
4. FOAL EAGLE (FE). An annual combined field training exercise (FTX) 
conducted between the armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
United States under the auspices of Combined Forces Command (CFC) 
within the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO). It is one of the largest 
military exercises conducted annually in the world. The primary purpose 
of Foal Eagle is to demonstrate ROK-U.S. military resolve to deter war on 
the Korean peninsula and to improve the combined and joint operational 
posture of those forces. 
D. FUTURE OF USPACOM JOINT EXERCISES 
The aforementioned joint exercises will remain in effect for years to come. The 
alliances are firm and necessary to ensure stability in the near and long term. Since 
change of the political and economic global climate is constant, the United States and its 
allies must continue to foster relationships facilitating advances in the understanding of 
their different cultures and values, as well as collectively remain vigilant and fiscally 
responsible in the way they operate together, both remaining militarily effective and 
finding ways to operate in the most cost-efficient manner.   
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The following chapter introduces a business case analysis model and structure in 
order to provide one means by which to examine and display/capture data to help forecast 
fiscally responsible logistics solutions that could be applied in a joint operating 
environment. After all, the United States’ constant FFP presence is necessary not only to 
support and complement each host-country’s military in a volatile region, but also to 
grow together with their allies, employ each other’s resources in the best manner 
possible, and achieve collective joint strategic objectives in USPACOM. 
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III. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
A BCA is a tool used by managers to assess how a new technology compares to 
an existing technology that performs the same function. The goal of a BCA is to help 
management decide whether to invest in the new technology and whether that new 
technology will bring sufficient additional value to the table to justify its costs. The BCA 
provides a justification for proceeding with a given project. In our case, the BCA is a 
decision tool providing structure to the display and represent complex data pulls relevant 
better business practices. A BCA is best presented in a well-structured, written document 
and typically describes the background of the project, the expected business benefits, the 
options considered, the expected costs of the project, the impact to stakeholders, and the 
expected risks (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2011). A BCA typically 
determines the following: 
 The relative cost versus benefits of different support strategies, 
 The methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs, 
 The impact and value of performance/cost/schedule/sustainment trade-
offs, 
 The data required to support and justify a performance-based logistics 
strategy, 
 The sensitivity of the data to change, 
 The analysis and classification of risks, and 
 A recommendation and summary of the implementation plan for 
proceeding with the best value alternative (DAU, 2011). 
BCAs typically continue throughout the life-cycle process of the project and are 
updated as necessary to reevaluate the project because life-cycle costs and other 
improvements may change. Due to this notion, there are no two BCAs that are exactly the 
same, and they are formatted and customized to each specific project. As illustrated in 




Figure 3.  Steps in the BCA Process (From DAU, 2011) 
A. DEFINITION 
In the definition stage (Chapter V) of the BCA, managers describe the scope of 
the analysis and set assumptions, constraints, and scenarios that will direct the analysis. 
During this stage, the managers identify the groundwork for the BCA and communicate 
to decision-makers the reasons why the analysis is needed. All alternatives identified are 
considered and compared to the status quo (DAU, 2011). 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
In the data collection stage (Chapter VI), managers identify the types of data that 
will be necessary to complete the analysis and classify that data into categories. They 
identify data sources and all relevant data, including cost data, as well as performance 
data. Managers estimate any data that is not available and describe the approach to that 
estimation. They normalize all data and scrutinize them for accuracy. Data normalization 
ensures that “apples are being compared to apples” (DAU, 2011). 
C. EVALUATION ANALYSIS 
In the evaluation analysis (Chapter VII), managers use the data collected in the 
second stage of the BCA and begin the applicable calculations using both quantitative 
and qualitative data. They compare each scenario against the other to determine which 
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alternative has the lowest cost and the best performance. Managers then identify an 
optimal combination of low cost and high performance to find the best value alternative. 
They also conduct a risk and sensitivity analysis, identify potential risks, and determine 
ways of mitigating those risks. Sensitivity analysis determines the effect that changes in 
particular inputs and constraints will have on the analysis (for example, changes in fuel 
costs or lower costs of the new alternative may change the solution; DAU, 2011).  
D. RESULTS PRESENTATION 
The results presentation is the final stage (Chapter VII). In this step, managers 
communicate the results of the analysis to the decision-makers. Managers construct their 
conclusions around the objectives of the analysis that they stated earlier in the case. They 
use charts and graphs to communicate the results of all quantitative data along with a 
narrative description to ensure that the results are easily interpreted. They also discuss 
any unexpected results, outliers, or easily misinterpreted results. Finally, they identify a 
recommended course of action and state support for that recommendation to bring closure 
to the analysis (DAU, 2011). 
E. BCA AND JUSMAG SUSTAINMENT 
We apply a BCA to the current sustainment methods being employed, on different 
levels, by the United States across the globe. In the next chapter, we introduce push-pull 
methodology following the logic of the above concepts. By conducting an in-depth BCA 
of the current global logistics supply chains, the United States and its allies can best 
determine solutions to joint strategic imperatives in USPACOM. It is no secret that the 
United States and its allies in Southeast Asia currently operate in a fiscally constrained 
environment, and, therefore, must apply due diligence to create more efficient means of 
resupply to and from all foreign countries. The BCA tool helps to determine which 
logistics approach would be most cost effective and efficient given the environmental 
constraints. 
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IV. SUPPLY CHAIN STRATEGIES 
Given the current global economic and security environment in the USPACOM, 
and the U.S. national and strategic shift in focus toward USPACOM in the coming years, 
a concurrent shift in the mindset of logistics policies, and system-wide education and 
improved communication, must follow in order to secure prosperity and security, and to 
ensure consistency with changing U.S. and allied strategic objectives for the very near 
future. The mindset shift must place more emphasis on a total pull system and, 
subsequently, apply equal reliance on the potential capability of host-country customs 
departments through increased pressure on the joint leadership of the United States, 
which is co-located within the customs departments of each host country in which the 
United States exercises regularly for continued FFP. 
In the following two sections, we discuss how supply chain strategies are 
categorized as either a push, pull or hybrid methodology. Each strategy is unique, with 
individual characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages. We explain in detail each one 
of these strategies in the context of BCA structure. It is important to understand these two 
systems in relation to which system is primarily employed—or could possibly be 
employed—globally by the U.S. military. Specifically, without an in-depth understanding 
of supply chains that are currently employed, it becomes difficult to justify a need for 
change to more efficient and effective DoD business practices. The purpose of this 
chapter is, therefore, to provide an elaborate definition and application of each 
methodology in order to build an argument for employment of a more efficient and 
effective global supply chain than can be feasibly employed by the DoD agencies across 
the board overseas.  
A. PUSH METHODOLOGY 
The push-based system of distribution has been in existence and documented as 
being used in production and manufacturing since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(although it was not always called “push”), coinciding with the manufacturing revolution 
that occurred during this same time period. In this system, manufacturers produce and 
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distribute their products based on historical retailer orders data. With this historical data, 
a manufacturer/supplier is able to create a demand forecast, allowing it to make 
production quantity decisions (Skjott-Larsen, Schary, & Mikkola, 2007, p. 89). Under the 
push system, “production is dominated by large consumer goods manufacturers. The 
manufacturers have long production runs in order to gain efficiencies of scale and 
minimize unit costs” (Bonacich & Wilson, 2008, p. 4). Under this system, manufacturers 
often entice retailers with promotions and discounts in order to attain large advanced 
purchases, pushing products out to the retailers’ warehouses.   
As with any type of supply chain strategy, there are always advantages and 
disadvantages of this production and distribution system. One advantage of using a push-
based system is the idea of “product certainty.”  Manufacturers know with little doubt 
that the demand for their product will be consistent, so they can continue to have long 
production runs. Certain commonly used and mass-production items (see Figure 4) such 
as diapers, office supplies, basic construction materials, soap or detergent, pasta, and so 
forth, will yield success within a push system because they will always have a constant 
demand. Figure 3 shows this point by showing that these products “are characterized by 
predictable demand and slow product introduction frequency” that are served best by 
utilizing a push-based strategy, yielding supply chain efficiency and high inventory turns 
(Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, & Simchi-Levi, 2008, p. 107). 
 
Figure 4.  Supply Chain Strategies (After Simchi-Levi et al., 2008)  
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To summarize, a push-based strategy is good for manufacturers if they are able to 
produce large amounts of a single product, spreading the setup costs against a large 
number of units. This will ultimately lower the individual costs to manufacture that item. 
This strategy is also good for items that have a predictable demand because the 
manufacturer can continue to produce this item knowing that the demand will not falter. 
The disadvantage of a push-based system is its reliance on forecasts used to determine 
production levels. There is no guarantee that the forecast will always be accurate, thereby 
creating the risk that there will not be enough of the product to meet demand or that there 
will be too much product, raising inventory holding costs. The push-based system is one 
option for replenishing stores, but specific to the DoD, the pull system is more applicable 
and more commonly used in U.S. military logistics. 
B. PULL METHODOLOGY 
The “pull” inventory management system, sometimes called just-in-time (JIT) 
management, began as one facet of Toyota’s “lean” production methodology. This is 
more well known in U.S. military logistics. The background idea of lean manufacturing 
was to create the desired product with as little waste as possible, with the definition of 
waste being anything that the customer did not want. If done properly, “lean” can provide 
immense gains “by eliminating non-value-adding activities, reducing lead times and 
faster flow through the factory by driving manufacturing through customer demand [pull] 
and continuous improvements” (Patni Computer Systems Limited, 2005, p. 9). This pull 
management system has now been incorporated into many manufacturing processes by a 
number of suppliers due to its direct impact on total costs through the reduction of 
operational expenses. 
The pull inventory management system performs as follows. When any item is 
sold by a retailer, that retailer places an order to replace that single item only. That single 
item, which would be the finished product handled by the supplier, is shipped to the 
retailer. The supplier now has a gap in its finished product inventory, so that supplier will 
now “pull” another finished product from upstream to replace what was shipped. If no 
finished product exists, an upstream workstation may have to complete the manufacturing 
 22
process. Regardless of the number of workstations involved in this total process, only one 
order moves at a time with each station pulling from the next upstream workstation. 
Eventually, the “last” upstream station is reached—that of bringing raw materials into the 
factory to begin the work-in-process labor. In practice, the pull system may involve larger 
orders (instead of a single unit) constituting what is called a Kanban: the standard lot size 
calculated for that particular item managed by the pull system. 
Boundaries, or clear separation points, can be created between push and pull 
methodologies where one method might be more profitable than the other. Performance 
measures such as customer wait time and service goals will allow the manufacturer to 
choose the correct support and distribution method. When determining this boundary 
between push and pull (see Figure 5), “the decoupling point separating the part of the 
supply chain operating in a make-to-order environment [pull] from the part of the supply 
chain based on planning [push]” must be ascertained (Croxton, Garcia-Dastugue, 
Lambert, & Rogers, 2001, p. 15). 
 
Figure 5.  Push-Pull Boundaries (From Simchi-Levi et al., 2008) 
The Kanban system (see Figure 6) is an example of the pull methodology in 
action. Also developed by Toyota, the Kanban system incorporates a visual trigger to 
signal demand. While the word “kanban” means “sign” or “instruction card,” there are 
also other paperless methods for controlling product movement. One example is the use 
of containers or bins—if the bin is empty, it means that the worker at that station has used 
up all available resources and must be resupplied in order to continue working. This 
empty bin is then filled by the next upstream worker from his own bin of ready-for-
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transfer parts. Other production lines might use colored golf balls to signify a requirement 
of a certain type of part needed in the manufacturing process. The key difference between 
the pull and push systems of inventory management can be seen with this example—
while a worker may have material that is ready to be used by the next person downstream 
in the manufacturing process, that material is not sent “down the line” until it is 
requested. Thus, the downstream worker pulls material from upstream rather than having 
it pushed to him (Jacobs, Chase, & Aquilano, 2009, p. 113). Stated a different way, “the 
ordering quantity for each process is determined on the basis of the consumed quantity at 
the inventory station where the items processed are stocked” (Takahashi & Nakamura, 
2004, p. 128). 
 
Figure 6.  Kanban System (From Jacobs et al., 2009) 
The greatest benefit of the pull methodology is the reduction in operational 
expenses because of the elimination of waste. Since orders are placed only upon a sale, 
another benefit is a reduction of working capital required for operations because work-in-
process inventory only needs to be as large as the next order (no stockpiling is required). 
Capital requirements are also reduced due to the fact that large amounts of cash are not 
typically tied up in held inventory—the retailer has an initial start-up cost to fill his or her 
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shelves but, after that, only orders what is actually selling. The pull method also allows 
for a retailer to take action only if demand changes, preventing the retailer from suffering 
from the bullwhip effect (Arts, 2004). 
Some of the risks of shifting to a pull method for inventory management include 
higher ordering and transportation costs, and strains on the supplier-retailer relationship 
because of more frequent orders. Due to the reduced order size when using the pull 
method (as opposed to the push methodology which orders up to a desired on-hand 
inventory number), and assuming that there is a fixed cost of placing an order, the 
ordering costs will rise in correlation to the increased number of orders. This ordering 
cost should be fairly stable after full conversion to the pull system, which will then make 
holding costs an overriding factor for implementation decisions. Since pulling inventory 
reduces the on-hand inventory requirement, the holding costs should also be reduced and 
the pull system should become “more cost-effective at a wider range as the demand level 
increases” (Abuhilal, Rabadi, & Sousa-Pouza, 2006, p. 54). 
Similar to ordering costs, the transportation costs that a business incurs when 
shifting to a pull inventory management system are likely to increase. These cost 
increases are due to the more frequent but smaller-sized deliveries required to ensure that 
a factory can remain a JIT producer. The increase in transportation costs may, however, 
be offset by the reduction in on-hand inventory requirements, so the total operating costs 
may actually fall (Aron, 1998, p. 59). Additionally, if a retailer is able to receive split 
vendor shipments, where merchandise originating from many companies is loaded onto 
the same truck for delivery, costs may be reduced by receipt of a single truck rather than 
numerous partially filled ones. 
Finally, the relationship between a supplier and a retailer can become strained 
when implementing a pull management system.  “With a pull contract the 
manufacturer/supplier bears the inventory risk because only the supplier holds inventory 
while the retailer replenishes as needed during the season” (Pearson, 2008, p. 497). Many 
of these retailers are risk averse and carry only the inventory that is found on the shelves 
of their stores, so they have to be willing to directly communicate with their suppliers and 
often even share real-time data. Retailers that have incorporated the pull inventory 
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management system often have some of the best information and technology 
infrastructure as well as supply chain management concepts in order to achieve this 
symbiotic working relationship with their suppliers (Wong, Arlbjorn, & Johansen, 2005, 
p. 367). 
As can be seen from the previous discussion, there are varying opinions on which 
method is best for production and distribution. While most academics and practitioners 
tend to favor the pull methodology, this is not always the correct option for every 
circumstance. The pull system is excellent in many environments, but it can also be 
disastrous in other operations. The main issue is that the pull system cannot react quickly 
to sudden increases in demand while the push system protects against these surges in 
demand by ensuring an increased on-hand inventory at all times. This balance between 
on-hand inventory and protection level is critical when considering the strategic 
implications overseas; for instance, if a U.S. F/A-18, when aircraft parts are at a premium 
and it is difficult to anticipate demand at the tip of the spear. 
C. PUSH-PULL HYBRID METHODOLOGY 
One of the main reasons why supply chain management currently receives so 
much attention is that information technology enables the shifting of a production and 
sales business model from “push type” to “pull type.”  There is an obvious benefit and 
legitimacy to the application of push and pull methodology, either together or separately, 
on a local and/or global market scene. Each niche market has distinct demands and 
resources that drive which method they subscribe to primarily in order to satisfy 
customers’ wants/needs and sustain sufficient revenues. Some execute their push or pull 
business processes more efficiently and effectively than others. As was alluded to in the 
previous sections of this chapter, most commercial and/or private businesses have the 
luxury of only losing money and customer loyalty if their business is run poorly by either 
method.   
The consequences in the DoD, however, and more specifically, the military, are 
much more severe and require continuous public scrutiny to ensure the most efficient and 
effective system is employed, adaptable to the ever-changing global security and 
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economic environment, and, ultimately—because of the logistical tyranny of distance—
deploying a push-pull system capable of responding to all U.S. war fighters’ needs and 
able to sustain equipment/asset readiness at optimal levels in order to thwart all enemy 
threats or aggression toward the United States or its allies. 
The current logistics system supported from CONUS and deployed in USPACOM 
is a push-pull hybrid system of many depositories and channels. Put simply, there are six 
aviation supply depots located in the United States stockpiled with parts that regularly 
“push” items to hundreds of warehouses located on many U.S. installations overseas in 
regular frequency in order to resupply inventory. Those overseas warehouses are then 
“pulled” from by squadrons exercising FFP spread across the vast region of Southeast 
Asia. As an example, using the F/A-18 aircraft-specific parts warehouse located on 
MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, a squadron places a requisition from a “forward deployed” joint 
aviation exercise site in Thailand for example—and the warehouse ships the requisitioned 
item(s) via commercial carrier or military lift to the location. As is captured in Figure 1, 
USPACOM is a vast area encompassing over 50% of the planet’s land and water mass. 
From Thailand to Japan alone, it is nearly 2,700 miles—a flight nearly equivalent to a 
coast-to-coast flight across the United States.   
Due to the dynamic operating environment, and extremely large footprint of U.S. 
forces in the region, the “complexities of our system have exceed[ed] our grasp” 
(McFarland, personal communication, 2012). Either through the use of a commercial 
carrier, or MilAir transport, the military has become very effective in expediting 
requisitions from a foreign country’s warehouse (i.e., MCAS Iwakuni, Japan) to the 
customs department in another country (i.e., Bangkok, Thailand) in a matter of one to two 
days, but immediately upon arrival of parts in to a host country, all efficiency and 
effectiveness are lost due to varying processing speeds, practices, and policies of the host 
country’s customs department. In many cases this results in prolonged delays before parts 
reaches its final destination.   
The complexities of each foreign customs department’s system will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next section (Operational and Strategic Scenarios), but bears 
mentioning when considering the push-pull system in its entirety currently deployed by 
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the U.S. military. The customs department’s “bottlenecks” of the USPACOM region do 
not complement the efficiencies and extreme effectiveness of the U.S. military’s ability to 
move its own gear, but, conversely, the actions of the host country’s customs department 
actually reside at the other end of the spectrum and are a near-future strategic concern of 
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V. OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC SCENARIOS 
As was introduced in Chapter III (BCA; Definition), the following chapter 
describes the scope of the analysis and sets assumptions, constraints, and scenarios that 
will guide further analysis. During this stage, we identify the groundwork for the BCA 
and communicate to decision-makers the reasons why the analysis is needed. All 
alternatives identified are considered and compared to the status quo (DAU, 2011). 
A. MILITARY POSTURE IN USPACOM 
“So many communists, so little time” was the attitude of many Western leaders 
during the Cold War era, according to the acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, Frank Kendall, back in the 1970s when he was a 
United States Army Captain. Fortunately, anti-communist sentiment has dissipated some 
since the end of the Cold War era, but threats still do persist today, albeit within the 
framework of a much more modern and economically in-tune nation—China. Although 
current relationships are far less tattered and fragile than they were 50 years ago, 
democracy still combats communist ideology, and the United States and China remain 
cognizant of each other’s actions or inactions politically, economically, or militarily. 
With what the near future may hold in the USPACOM region politically, one can only 
hope that diplomacy succeeds, conflict is avoided, and the democratic disposition of all 
allied countries in the region remains firm. The United States and its allies must plan for 
potential conflict in Asia, and logistics capability (or lack thereof) should be at the 
forefront of joint planning in order to satisfy U.S. national and allied security and stability 
objectives. Without a sound joint logistics plan, as well as sound SOFA agreements intact 
for commercial shipments, the United States and its allies may not be able to respond to 
personnel and equipment readiness support issues in a timely manner.  
Each U.S. military service currently has personnel and equipment prepositioned 
throughout USPACOM in order to sustain FFP and collectively contribute to regional 
stability. There are currently over 300,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the region, 
as well as billions of dollars in assets and facilities that must be maintained. Aside from 
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ensuring the safety and security of U.S. military personnel in the region while executing 
their individual daily missions, the United States’ second most important national asset in 
USPACOM is the fixed-wing aircraft and squadrons that are either permanently stationed 
in the region, or a Unit Deployment Program (UDP) flying squadron that rotates in and 
out of the region from the continental U.S. (CONUS) every six to seven months. There 
are, at any given time, approximately 40 USMC fixed-wing aircraft disproportionately 
spread about the airspace or on the deck in an allied country in USPACOM, most of 
which are capable on a moment’s notice of delivering bombs to the doorstep of our 
adversaries and ensuring what could otherwise evolve into a conventional war over 
50 years ago, is in actuality today a short “battle” of seconds. Elevated readiness to 
achieve these ends comes at an extremely high cost, however, and is not easily achieved. 
In the next chapter (Supply Chain in USPACOM), logistics and other sustainment costs 
will be analyzed. A high level of political and fiscal nurturing is inevitably required, but 
necessary, to secure increased aircraft readiness and as a result, added stability in the 
USPACOM AOR. 
The readiness of U.S. F/A-18 and U.S. Air Force F/A-16 aircraft is essential to 
sustaining and evolving FFP measures in USPACOM. The higher the readiness of U.S. 
fixed-wing aircraft in USPACOM, the higher the capability of the United States and its 
allies is to counteract any threat or aggression in the region at a moment’s notice. How 
does the United States sustain and forecast elevated readiness levels in the future for an 
unstable region encompassing over 30,000 square miles?  Better yet, how does the United 
States remain at the tip of the spear and implement evolving technologies to build an 
established logistics distribution network to increase its efficiencies and effectiveness?  
We argue that to accomplish this goal, we must improve processes that are organic to the 
U.S. military and commercial sectors to compensate for poor host-country customs 
logistics throughput. The hard answer is that with more diligence, diplomatically engage 
allied host countries in an attempt to achieve decreased entry barriers for our 
assets/parts/gear to achieve increased logistics throughput through these countries’ 
customs departments.      
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Imagine the most dense, tangled, disproportionate, three-dimensional spider web 
cloaking the USPACOM AOR. Imagine the ends of each thread halting in the capital city 
of each allied country with the center of the spider web located in MCAS Iwakuni, Japan. 
The end of each thread in each capital city would further represent the location of the 
host-country customs department. A spider moves much more quickly along each thread 
to capture its prey than operating outside the confines of its web. Operating outside the 
confines of the web for the spider is foreign, unfamiliar, constrained, and uncertain. 
Similar to the external environment of the web for a spider is the United States’ 
understanding of how to increase its sphere of influence, change policy, and, ultimately, 
realize improved joint logistics throughput in host-country customs departments for 
commercially shipped national assets (i.e., aircraft parts). It is a theater-wide challenge 
that continues to evade understanding from policy-makers at the national level and to 
garner emphasis from leadership at the strategic level, persuasion from contract/SOFA 
negotiators at the operational level, and efficiency and effectiveness of logisticians at the 
tactical level.   
The following subsections introduce and display the different customs SOPs of a 
few of the allied countries in which the United States exercises annually. Visits were 
made by one of the authors of this project to each country discussed in order to gather 
data relevant to the research. In this fashion, the on-site research facilitated an in-depth 
understanding of the complex challenge at-hand for the DoD and DoS in continually 
attempting to influence dramatic change to international business practices, most of 
which consisting of foreign agencies that do not have a deep vested interest in the end 
result of improving their processes (ie. increased logistics throughput for U.S. piece-parts 
for U.S. assets and aircraft). The purpose, furthermore, is to elaborate on the many 
different cultures and business climates that play a crucial role in expediting U.S. assets 
from beginning to end through the customs process. 
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B. THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 
The Kingdom of Thailand presents its own unique requirement for commercial 
shipments via FedEx and DHL. The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) and other customs 
personnel work limited hours and are oftentimes reported to be in and out of the office 
throughout normal business hours; most of which is out of U.S. control to change. 
However, the purpose of the U.S. Marine Log Cell position is to effect change and 
influence and expedite aircraft parts/paperwork as quickly as possible by being persistent, 
albeit tactful, in how the RTAF is approached and how quickly it processes U.S. items.   
As shown in Table 1, most parts over the past three years for Joint Exercise Cobra 
Gold arrived from MCAS Iwakuni to Bangkok within one day, and then remained in the 
customs pipeline for two to seven days because of the approximately 18 different RTAF 
members, RTAF airport customs personnel, or U.S. Embassy GSO (operated by Foreign 
Service Nationals) who must approve and route the paperwork and parts.  They move at 
their own speed.  Because a large amount of work is completed behind the scenes by U.S. 
Log Cell officers, the customs process currently employed may possibly be as 
streamlined as it can get, but it is far from perfect.  Two U.S. military members manage 
the customs requirements for the entire Joint Task Force and receive shipments from 
across Asia and the United States.  There is no interaction between this U.S. Log Cell, 
Thai Customs, and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) except through the carrier—
DHL or FedEx. However, the responsibilities of the U.S. Log Cell officer(s) are 
described below: 
1. Serve as a conduit between the commercial carriers and JUSMAGTHAI, 
2. Pre-clear shipments via e-mail in order to expedite shipments, 
3. Work closely with Thai military and Customs officials for cargo 
clearance, 
4. Be familiar with aircraft material and be able to speak intelligently when 
describing the function of inbound material. 
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Table 1.   Summary of Distance and TRR to Exercise Cobra Gold 
 
Note: Data courtesy of MAG-12 Distribution Management Office 
 
The U.S. Log Cell never physically sees or touches any parts/gear; the parts/gear 
remain in a bonded warehouse at the freeport area of the airport until all paperwork is 
signed.  The gear/parts are not released from the airport until the 18 customs agents 
located at the aforementioned BKK airport, GSO, or JUSMAGTHAI have processed the 
paperwork.  
The accuracy of shipping documentation is an important factor in expediting the 
customs process. A Thai military official and a U.S. military official will certify all 
shipments arriving in support of the exercise. Thai Customs requires a detailed packing 
list of all shipments, including the items’ composition, intended use, and users. 
Additionally, sustainment shipments must be coordinated with Customs Log Cell to 
alleviate the documentation process. A brief breakdown of the shipping and customs 
process and timeline is provided here: 
1. The shipper arranges with their respective shipping agency for shipment of 
items using the Cobra Gold Commercial Carrier (Day 1). 
2. The shipping agency then notifies the Customs Log Cell of the shipment 
and must fax or e-mail the documentation to the Customs Log Cell. Thai 
Customs authorities require original documents for all shipments. The 
Customs Log Cell will complete this requirement (Day 1). 
3. Once the Customs Log Cell receives the documents from the shipper, an 
exemption letter is generated and signed by the Customs Log Cell and a 
Thai military counterpart. This letter may be delivered to the Thai military 
counterpart via the courier (Days 2–4). 
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4. The exemption letter is then given to the commercial carrier to clear 
customs. The commercial carrier provides the exemption letter, airway 
bill, and packing list, in English, to the Thai Customs authority to clear 
customs (Days 2–4). This process can take place while the shipment is in 
transit.   
5. If the process is completed correctly, the customs authority immediately 
releases the shipment once it arrives and the carrier forwards it to its final 
destination (Days 2–7). Shipments of high-value items are assessed a fee. 
The carriers add this fee to the overall shipping cost. 
6. Shipments with a value of less than U.S. $1,200 are processed for tax 
exempt status and incur the customs tax fee. These fees are extremely 
small (pennies on the dollar) and result in immediate delivery of those 
shipments.  
As is captured in Figure 7, the process is lengthy with many steps to completion. 
Thailand and the United States seem to be postured for a long allied partnership in the 
region, but logistics-specific negotiations must continue to press the degree of 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the current inbound system. Joint force readiness is 
ultimately at the mercy of how the customs system honors the United States’ need for 
increased speed and overall throughput of all assets. Currently, there is much to be 
desired in the working relationship, diplomacy, and logistics throughput for joint 
exercises in the Kingdom of Thailand. 
 




Although Australian customs requirements are the most stringent of all 
USPACOM-allied countries, they are reasonably effective in processing U.S. assets 
through their checkpoints, and the tyranny of distance between MALS-12 in Japan, and 
the distance between the port of entry (Darwin, Townsville, or Rockhampton) and the 
actual joint exercise site. 
As is displayed in Table 2, three to six days for Exercises Southern Frontier, 
Talisman Saber, and Pitch Black is still unacceptable for a commercially shipped item 
from Japan, but when considering that all items shipped from Japan to joint exercises in 
Australia travel on average a total distance of over 6,000 miles, and are processed 
through several different hubs on a long journey of trucks and planes, it is perhaps a 
reasonable time frame. However, the planes, trucks, and commercial carrier are not the 
issue. The lengthy customs process still could be improved upon. 
Table 2.   Summary of Distance and TRR to Exercise Southern Frontier/ 
Talisman Saber 
 
Note: Data courtesy of MAG-12 Distribution Management Office 
 
Each customs department has its own process and number of host-nation 
personnel involved in the often-cumbersome clearance process. For starters, an 
Australian Broker/Shipping Agent is required to lodge a Quarantine Entry for goods 
processing of equipment and inbound U.S. assets. A manifest of cargo must be supplied 
to the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) and the shipper’s Australian 
Broker/Shipping Agent prior to cargo arriving in Australia. To avoid delays, the lists 
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need to be complete, legible, and accurate, and contain a full description of the goods 
with estimated costs of the goods; NATO or defense stock numbers by themselves are not 
sufficient. Accurate and detailed manifests ensure the efficient clearance of cargo. 
Accuracy and legibility of paperwork is the key to ensuring the quickest throughput of 
items through Australian Customs. 
The earlier the cargo manifest is reported, the quicker clearance can be obtained. 
If the U.S. military employs the services of a customs broker, bureau, or a cargo reporter 
to report their cargo, goods are reported in the Integrated Cargo System (ICS). Customs 
and Border Protection legislation requires that goods be formally entered unless 
specifically exempted. There is no provision in the legislation that allows for goods 
owned by the U.S. military to be exempt from the legislative requirements. The 
Australian Customs Tariff Act of 1995, under Item 4, Schedule 4, allows for the duty- 
and tax-free entry of goods that are 
1. Owned by the government of another country; 
2. For the official use of that government and not to be used for the purposes 
of trade; and  
3. Required in accordance with an arrangement or agreement between the 
Australian government and the government of that other country. 
These goods to be imported will be entered on an Import Declaration. The goods 
should be described as “Military equipment for the use of U.S. armed forces.”  Unless 
arrangements are in place to report military cargo electronically, the Australian Customs 
Bureau (ACB) will continue to allow military cargo to be reported on paper manifests. A 
legible cargo manifest, containing a full description of goods (not part numbers or 
inventory numbers), will be submitted to ACB prior to arrival at the first port of entry, 
and, at a minimum, a copy should be on board at the first port of entry. Lastly, cargo 
manifests need to be detailed, not just generalizations, and are subject to risk assessment 




Goods arriving into Australia on a temporary basis may also be imported under 
section 162 of the Act, which allows for a duty- and tax-free entry of goods. Where a 
temporary importation under section 162 is utilized, an import declaration that lists every 
cargo item is required. A cash security and a bank guarantee are also required to cover 
the duty. 
The Australian military is one of the staunchest advocates and strong players 
alongside the United States in FFP in the USPACOM region. Although they employ 
stringent customs practices that do not facilitate optimal joint military readiness for their 
exercises, they continue to be willing to adapt to change and maintain a strong rapport 
with the U.S. government and military. 
D. THE PHILIPPINES 
The Philippine customs system is very similar to the system in Thailand. All of 
the same organically capable agencies are present and functional; however, the customs 
processes encompass only 11 total personnel (as opposed to 18 in Thailand) and three 
buildings located closely together in the same area of Manila. Transit time and other 
business practices are streamlined because of the proximity between offices (because 
most documents are routed as hard copies and not via e-mail) and continued effective 
communication. All of this contributes to a shorter logistics throughput lag-time than 
currently present in Bangkok, Thailand. Table 3 below provides a breakdown of the 
logistics life-cycle dynamic for Joint Exercise PHIBLEX or Balikatan (Philippines) for 
2008–2011. 
All equipment that arrives from another country via commercial air or sea to the 
Philippines requires clearance from the Customs Department of the Philippine 
government. The breakdown of delays and TRR is displayed in Table 3 on the previous 
page. Military cargo coming on military sea or air components does not require customs 
clearance. Customs clearance packages are generated, processed, and sent to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) for clearance by the staff at the U.S. Transportation 
Unit on the U.S. Embassy compound working in conjunction with host-country officials.   
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Table 3.   Summary of Distance and TRR to Exercise Balikatan/PHIBLEX 
 
Note: Data courtesy of MAG-12 Distribution Management Office 
For customs packages, the minimum amount of paperwork required for each 
shipment includes the following: 
1. Certificate of tax exemption form (CTE), 
2. Packing/inventory list, 
3. Bill of lading (or airway bill), 
4. Broker authorization form, and 
5. Certificate of guarantee  (for air shipment only) 
From the time the U.S. officials receive both the shipment inventory and the bill 
of lading, it takes on average two to four work days to generate a complete package for 
routing to the Defense Finance Agency (DFA) and, subsequently, deliver to the U.S. unit 
in country. The paperwork flow within the Philippine government can be very rigid and 
slow at times, but it is well organized and all communication lines are open. Specifically, 
many of the local customs representatives and GSO foreign-service nationals have been 
working together for years, and obvious continuity and strong working relationships 
exist. However, challenges persist that could be improved upon to increase the overall 
timeliness of arrival of assets that are shipped from Japan to the Philippines.   
It is absolutely essential that required paperwork arrives to the U.S. Embassy 
GSO office as soon as a requirement is realized for a joint exercise in order to ensure the 

















































Figure 8.  Customs Process at JUSMAGPHIL, Manila (Courtesy of JUSMAGPHIL 
Staff via personal communication) 
The most common problem Philippine customs officials witness on a daily basis 
is the wrong address, which occurs 50% of the time. The second most common problem 
realized is the lack of advanced documentation, which occurs about 40% of the time. The 
third most common problem is the wrong or incomplete description of the item, which 
occurs about 10% of the time. If the GSO is provided advanced notice of an incorrect bill 
of lading address, it can fix the problem before the shipment arrives. Once the shipment 
arrives, if the address is incorrect, the GSO office is required to submit a change of 
address request to Customs, via the DFA, which could add another three to five days to 
the processing time. 
E. COMBINED CUSTOMS ANALYSIS OF THAILAND, AUSTRALIA AND 
THE PHILIPPINES 
To understand these dynamics, it is essential to understand how long items 
typically would take to arrive in Thailand, Australia, or the Philippines if SOFA 
agreements were non-existent and U.S. personnel were not stationed in country to 
expedite the process. The total process would take nearly 20 days for a part to arrive to 
the Philippines, for example, if there were not already SOFA agreements in place 
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requiring U.S. and host-country cooperation to meet the requirements and prerequisites 
from both countries. The customs departments of these countries process nearly 10,000 
items annually. That is an average of 27 items a day—a lot of paper shuffling to ensure 
many hundreds of different boxes and forms are completely filled in, and most 
importantly, filled in correctly. The system is better off with SOFA agreements having 
now been in place for several years. However, there is always room for improvement. 
This invites all the more reason to research viable alternatives to repair the current host-
country customs departments’ in-processing time of U.S. assets.    
F. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS SPECIFIC TO CUSTOMS 
CHALLENGES 
When U.S. Marines go to the rifle range annually, they train to get better so that if 
in combat they are best prepared to react and employ their rifle in a timely and effective 
manner. They train to get better. They typically realize their deficiencies on the first day 
of familiarization firing, and work expeditiously to fine-tune their muscle memory, 
improve their effectiveness, and gain greater competency with their weapon over the 
course of the one to two week training period. They are attempting to get better over that 
period, not just trying to get by and survive the training. That is the purpose of training at 
the micro level at a USMC rifle range, just as it is at the macro level, for instance, during 
each Joint Exercise conducted in any U.S.-allied countries in USPACOM—the staffs 
within the customs departments should work and train to improve their processes, and not 
view the increased logistics footprint during an exercise as solely an increase in 
workload, but, better, as an opportunity to train and increase the speed at which items are 
processed through.   
Each foreign customs department has its policies in place governing how it 
processes inbound or outbound items. Each local JUSMAG has policies that govern their 
customs-specific function. Each General Services Office also has its standard operating 
procedures to follow to in-process foreign items. None of these systems, however, has a 
set maximum time frame to process items, and, therefore, there is little accountability or 
incentive to improve. This mindset must change if increased throughput will ever occur.  
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Because of the strategic implications of poor logistics throughput, each allied country 
should work to improve all joint logistics processes in order to support conflict within 
their respective borders. 
If China is rapidly gaining ground economically and militarily in the USPACOM 
region, and if allied countries wish to continue to rely heavily on the United States for 
FFP as a deterrent for China and other smaller threats, then the host-country customs 
barriers should be minimal for inbound and outbound critical U.S. assets affecting joint 
military readiness not only for the short durations necessary for annual joint exercises, 
but also for every day throughout the year, if needed, in preparation for a larger conflict. 
Host-country customs policies should, however, obviously remain firm with regards to all 
other routine and ordinary commercial items (i.e., civilian non-DoD commercial 
shipments), personnel, or gear that arrive in country, but hard-line SOFA policy 
negotiations must change and loosen the bottleneck realized whenever a U.S. asset is 
shipped commercially to an allied country. The United States is simply too effective and 
efficient (through employment of commercial carriers) otherwise to be penalized and 
experience days-on-end delays waiting for an asset to clear each host-country’s customs 
pipeline, especially when the asset most likely arrived at the allied country in less than 
one day. Time is money, and the United States is spending funding inefficiently and 
readiness each day an asset trudges through each respective customs pipeline. All allied 
host countries must, in other words, take a more diligent “help us help you” approach to 
support the efforts of the United States to conduct FFP measures and experience 
increased joint force readiness through fully optimal increased logistics throughput.   
If hard-line negotiations fail to achieve abolishment of customs processing at the 
point of entry in a host country, then a separate approach would still be an improvement 
from each country’s current system. For example, a process similar to what occurs during 
an Australian Quarantine Inspections Service (AQIS) inspection could be implemented. 
For this inspection, which occurs aboard MCAS Iwakuni annually about a month before 
the first fly day of Exercise Southern Frontier, Pitch Black, or Talisman Sabre, a team of 
Australian customs agents is flown to the point of debarkation/origin (MCAS Iwakuni) to 
pre-inspect larger bulk items that will be shipped via commercial black-bottom boat or 
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commercial air. The main purpose of the AQIS Customs inspection of large gear and 
ammo before arrival in Australia is to pre-clear all U.S. assets, and, therefore, facilitate a 
quick and eventless offload of all items upon arrival to any of the three ports for these 
three exercises. If, for instance, the Thai, Philippine, and Australian governments could 
approach the shipment of individual assets in the same manner, money, time and, 
therefore, military readiness, would be spared on the back-end because each item would 
be cleared for immediate delivery upon arrival in a host country. Specifically, 
consideration should be given to the cost of sending an RTAF member and Thai GSO 
representative TAD to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, for the two to three week duration of 
annual Joint Exercise Cobra Gold to perform pre-clear functions that would otherwise 
have to be performed in Thailand. Probably not as much as it costs to have a U.S. F/A-18 
aircraft NMC on the deck in Khorat or U’Tapao, Thailand, for days if the part were 
shipped per the current commercial and host-country customs system.   
To show this, in the next chapter (CH. VI, Supply Chain in USPACOM), we 
dissect the fiscal viability of each of these options to show the added efficiency and 
effectiveness if host-country systems were to implement policy amendments and change 
their organizational behavior. 
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VI. SUPPLY CHAIN IN USPACOM 
 
Representing the data collection stage of the BCA relevant primarily to pull-type 
SCM methodology, in this chapter we identify the range of data that will be necessary to 
complete the analysis and classify that data into categories (cost and performance) for 
analysis in follow-on chapters. We estimate any data that is not available and describe the 
approach to that estimation. For clarity, we further normalize all data and scrutinize it for 
accuracy. Data normalization ensures that “apples are being compared to apples” (DAU, 
2011). 
During the Internet boom, retailers and consumer-packaged goods 
manufacturers began talking about a new kind of demand-driven supply chain. Rather 
than build product based on historical forecasts, load up a warehouse, and then push 
product out to the marketplace, savvy supply chain managers would capture real-time 
demand from point-of-sale systems and cash registers and use the emerging supply 
chain planning and management tools to make products according to demand:  Sell one, 
make one. If a company could really capture what its customers were buying, less 
excess inventory would pile up in warehouses. Maintaining and operating an aircraft—
especially one as complicated as a military fighter jet—is obviously more complicated 
than packaging common food items or manufacturing military combat boots. So much 
of what is repaired is unplanned, and so much of what is shipped is unanticipated, and 
that makes it hard to plan and achieve a directed mission capable readiness goal. What 
is more, there is no check-out counter next to a maintenance hangar to capture demand. 
Worse yet, the consequences of having an aircraft on the ground because of a stock-out 
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are greater than Wal-Mart running short on food on a Friday night or a military 
warehouse running short on spare boots in garrison. 
As mentioned previously in the Strategic and Operational Scenarios, aside from 
ensuring the United States’ number one asset—service members—is secure and safe, the 
nation’s most critical asset toward FFP is the fighter jets prepositioned abroad in 
USPACOM. Aside from, and excusing the extreme fiscal obligations, these jets must be 
maintained in peak condition for flight safety purposes, and to satisfy the United States’ 
national strategic objective of FFP in the USPACOM region. How are these elite aircraft 
sustained and flying squadrons supported at peak levels?  The primary method is 
currently parts transport via the KC-130J “Super Hercules” of VMGR-152 across the vast 
area of the Pacific region. 
As mentioned earlier in the problem statement of this project, VMGR-152 is the 
sole USMC KC-130 squadron supporting Marine forces in the Pacific. These 12 large 
and unique heavy-lift transport aircraft are charged with “supporting the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander by providing aerial refueling and assault 
support, day or night under all weather conditions, during expeditionary, joint, or 
combined operations” (www.marines.mil/). Flight data for each leg of flight are recorded 
and tracked via the Marine-Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (MSHARP). Each 
leg of each flight is documented, and the contents/purpose of each flight is captured 
within the system. Table 4 provides a snapshot of the total poundage and frequency of 
cargo moved from 2008–2011.  
Table 4.   Summary of Cargo Moved via MilAir 
 
Note: Data obtained from MSHARP 
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VII. DATA ANALYSIS 
In reference to the evaluation analysis stage of the BCA, in this chapter we use the 
data collected in the second stage (Data Collection) of the BCA and begin the applicable 
calculations using both quantitative and qualitative data. We compare each scenario 
against the other to determine which alternative has the lowest cost and the best 
performance. We then identify an optimal combination of low cost and high performance 
to find the best value alternative. Additionally, we conduct a risk and sensitivity analysis, 
identify potential risks, and determine ways of mitigating those risks. The sensitivity 
analysis section specifically, determines the effect that changes in particular inputs and 
constraints will have on the analysis (for example, changes in fuel costs or lower costs of 
the new alternative may change the solution; DAU, 2011). 
A. UTILIZATION OF MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
In an attempt to more fully capture the costs incurred by both commercial and 
MilAir shipping methods, this study considers the delays in both of these shipping 
methods. However, some values for variables in this study are not available. Therefore, 
this study uses a simulation technique (Monte Carlo) to determine costs associated with 
both host country customs and overall TRR delays in shipping. The study utilizes Crystal 
Ball (a Microsoft Excel application) to run 10,000 trials of the relevant scenarios.   
The highlighted cells in Table 5 above represent the three variables that held 
significant variance from the data provided by DMO. DMO was unable to provide data 
down to “single part” specificity and therefore this study uses a triangular distribution 
for: 
 Average time parts spent in customs department 
 TRR commercial 
 TRR MilAir  
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Table 5.   Summary of Customs and TRR Delays 
 
Note: Data courtesy of MAG-12 Distribution Management Office 
 
A triangular distribution is used as a result of multiple discussions with DMO 
which established the shortest, average and longest delays for each country.   As an 
example and in reference to historical data presented in previous chapters, it is known 
that the TRR window for a commercially delivered part from Iwakuni, Japan to Khorat, 
Thailand is four to seven days. 
The next variable derived is the annual costs of shipping parts commercially and 
via MilAir. DMO was unable to provide “single part” data but was able to provide the 
average number of parts shipped per year as shown in Table 5 above. Important to note is 
the number of parts shipped is an annual number and can simply be multiplied by 3 to 
derive the total number of parts shipped for the previous three years. The number of parts 
shipped is then multiplied by the average cost of shipping those parts commercially for 
each year. The MilAir shipping costs are slightly more involved to derive.   
Using the average number of parts shipped via MilAir is only part of the 
necessary equation. The weight of the parts is also needed. An assumed distribution is 
made with respect to the frequency in which various F/A-18 parts of various weights are 
shipped. DMO was able to provide weight and dimensions of the heaviest F/A-18 part 
that is shipped. This part is the horizontal stabilizer which weighs approximately 1200 lbs 
and is transportable by the KC-130J. It is important to note that an F/A-18’s engine is 
heavier but unique shipping requirements and regulations preclude it from being included 
in this study. As a result of discussions with DMO, the following weights with their 
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respective probabilities are used to establish the assumed distribution: 1 lbs (20%), 5 lbs 
(20%), 20 lbs (50%), 500 lbs (5%) and 1200 lbs (5%). 
Using M-SHARP, all VMGR-152 KC-130J flights records are pulled for the 
periods covering each of the four exercises. From this data, the total number of flights 
and cargo loads are found for each exercise. This study looks only at the flights taking 
cargo to the exercise destinations and did not factor the costs of return flights. Straight-
line distances and a cruising speed of 350 knots are used to calculate total flight hours to 
each exercise’s location. A per flight hour rate of $5,000 is used in calculating the KC-
130J costs. This rate accounts for fuel costs only and does not necessarily capture the full 
cost of operating/maintaining the KC-130J. The additional operating costs (i.e., salaries 
of aircrew, maintenance hours/flight hour, etc.) are viewed as sunk costs.   
Table 6 shows the breakdown of the flights and cargo to each exercise. A further 
breakdown of the total cargo and total costs are used to derive the per pound costs.   By 
multiplying this per pound cost by the expected weight of an F/A-18 part (distributed as 
discussed in the previous paragraph) the annual cost of moving said parts via KC-130J is 
achieved. These costs reflect the per pound rate that is being incurred to ship parts via 
MilAir. An interesting observation, however, is that nearly all the flights observed carried 
significantly less than their full capacity of 55,000 lbs. This aspect is discussed further in 
Chapter VIII. 
Table 6.   Summary of MilAir Cargo/Costs 
 
Note: Data courtesy of MAG-12 Distribution Management Office 
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The third area of costs involves the Temporary Assigned Duty (TAD) costs of 
personnel at the four exercise locations. The TAD cost calculations assume the full per 
diem rate and that the average size of an F/A-18 maintenance department is around 170 
Marines (these are the Marines whose primary job is to perform maintenance on aircraft). 
TAD pay is at a flat-rate, regardless of rank, which makes it easy to apply to the 170 
Marines. Using the TAD rates, a daily cost of TAD is established by exercise location 
and year for the 170 Marines (Table 7). 
Table 7.   Summary of TAD Costs 
 
Note: Source www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/perdiemCalc.cfm 
 
Using these daily TAD amounts, the next step calculates how much TAD is paid 
per available maintenance hour by dividing the 170 Marines into two 8-hour shifts for a 
total of 1,360 hours/day. Using this number of maintenance hours per day, the study 
establishes a per-hour of maintenance TAD rate. These rates represent 170 Marines who 
are “gainfully employed,” meaning that they were able to perform maintenance hours for 
their entire eight-hour shift. 
However, what if the 170 Marines cannot perform maintenance because they are 
awaiting parts?  This question is at the crux of the TAD costs. To account for hours “lost” 
to customs and TRR delays, a 75% reduction of daily maintenance hours is applied for 
every day of delays. This means that for every day an aircraft part is delayed in shipping, 
the 170 Marines can only accomplish 25% of their daily tasks. Appling this reduction, the 
number of useful man hours becomes 340 among the 170 Marines. 
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While TAD is paid regardless of what Marines are doing in the location they are 
at, efforts should be made to maximize the efficiency of these dollars. By applying the 
reduction discussed previously, a sort of efficiency rating emerges that shows how much 
the daily TAD dollars are buying. Table 8 shows a side-by-side comparison of the daily 
costs of maintenance hours with and without the reduction (i.e., when parts are available 
versus when the Marines are awaiting parts). It is important to note that during the early 
stages of the exercises, these are more of a TAD efficiency measure rather than actual 
costs. However, if the delays occur at the end of an exercise and force maintainers to stay 
longer than planned at the exercise locations (in order to fix a downed aircraft) these may 
quickly become actual costs that can be directly attributed to Customs and TRR delays. 
Table 8.   Summary of TAD Rates 
 
Note: Source www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/perdiemCalc.cfm 
B. BASELINE COSTS/ASSUMPTIONS 
Using the costs and assumptions discussed in the previous section, the Monte 
Carlo simulation provides total costs for each location over the three-year period. Each 
location’s results, which served as a baseline for our analysis, are discussed in the next 
section. 
1. Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger—Thailand 
Figures 9–13 and Tables 9–13 show the results of the Monte Carlo simulation for 
both commercial shipping costs and MilAir shipping costs. They include a breakdown of 
TAD costs as attributed to both customs delays and overall TRR delays. An average cost 
and a 90% certainty range are also provided for all forecasts. It should be noted that 
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Crystal Ball is licensed for educational use by The Naval Postgraduate School and 
therefore all charts in this section contain the statement “Not for Commercial Use.” 
 
 
Figure 9.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger Total Commercial Shipping Costs 
 
















Figure 10.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger Total MilAir Shipping Costs 
 

















Figure 11.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger TAD Costs for Commercial TRR Delays 
 















Figure 12.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger TAD Costs for MilAir TRR Delays 
 

















Figure 13.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger TAD Costs for Customs Delays (Applies to 
Commercial Shipping Only) 
 





2. Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier—Australia 
Figures 14-18 and Tables 14–18 show the results of the Monte Carlo simulation 
for both commercial shipping costs and MilAir shipping costs. They include a breakdown 
of TAD costs as attributed to both customs delays and overall TRR delays. An average 
cost and a 90% certainty range is also provided for all forecasts. 
 
Figure 14.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier Total Commercial Shipping Costs 

















Figure 15.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier Total MilAir Shipping Costs 















Figure 16.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier TAD Costs for Commercial TRR Delays 

















Figure 17.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier TAD Costs for MilAir TRR Delays 


















Figure 18.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier TAD Costs for Customs Delays (Applies to 
Commercial Shipping Only) 








Figures 19–23 and Tables 19–23 show the results of the Monte Carlo simulation 
for both commercial shipping costs and MilAir shipping costs. They include a breakdown 
of TAD costs as attributed to both customs delays and overall TRR delays. An average 
cost and a 90% certainty range are also provided for all forecasts. 
 
Figure 19.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX Total Commercial Shipping Costs 














Figure 20.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX Total MilAir Shipping Costs 

















Figure 21.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX TAD Costs for Commercial TRR Delays 


















Figure 22.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX TAD Costs for MilAir TRR Delays 

















Figure 23.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX TAD Costs for Customs Delays (Applies to Commercial 
Shipping Only) 







4. Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle—South Korea 
Figures 24–28 and Tables 24–28 show the results of the Monte Carlo simulation 
for both commercial shipping costs and MilAir shipping costs. They include a breakdown 
of TAD costs as attributed to both customs delays and overall TRR delays. An average 
cost and a 90% certainty range are also provided for all forecasts. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle Total Commercial Shipping Costs 

















Figure 25.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle Total MilAir Shipping Costs 















Figure 26.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle TAD Costs for Commercial TRR 
Delays 
















Figure 27.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle TAD Costs for MilAir TRR Delays 

















Figure 28.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle TAD Costs for Customs Delays 
(Applies to Commercial Shipping Only) 





C. COST DRIVERS 
From the results of the Monte Carlo simulations presented above, and remaining 
in-line with the evaluation analyses stage, flow, and process of the BCA, it can quickly be 
seen in this section that significant costs arise due to customs delays for commercially 
shipped parts. On average, these costs are $187,169; $517,896; $221,767 and $24,037 for 
Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger, Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier, Balikatan/PHIBLEX, and 
Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle, respectively, from 2008–2011. Again, these 
costs reflect wasted TAD funds being spent for Marines who cannot perform their daily 
duties because they are awaiting parts, but they do not include the other possible costs 
that may result from a broken aircraft that is sitting and unable to fly. 
A squadron CO will employ as many aircraft on the flight schedule as the 
maintenance department can provide in a MC status the following day. If the aircraft 
maintenance officer of an F/A-18 squadron anticipates he or she will have eight of 
12 aircraft in an MC status the following day, then in most training environments the CO 
will maximize aircrew training and schedule all eight aircraft for use on the flight 
schedule on a given day. If 10 aircraft are MC, 10 aircraft will most likely be flown, and 
so forth. The idea is the more aircraft that are available, the higher the readiness will 
obviously be. In addition, an increase in aircrew training will be realized, and, in turn, the 
aircrew will accomplish their training requirements within the required time frame or 
sooner. If readiness is optimal, and all training requirements are met before a scheduled 
deployment, mission, or exercise, then the squadron CO has an added opportunity to 
refine aircrew flight skills/knowledge through additional flights/training.   
This concept becomes even more important when a squadron is participating in an 
exercise away from their home station. In these cases, the DoD is paying extra monies (in 
the form of TAD funds) to allow the squadron to carry out daily training. During an 
exercise, the value of TAD funds are represented by the extent of training the squadron 
can accomplish. This metric is, of course, directly affected by the waiting times that this 
research has discussed. 
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This scenario occurs year in and year out during exercises in the USPACOM 
AOR because C-130s are the most effective (fastest due to lack of customs delays) means 
of moving parts, and because current customs lag-time is a bridge too far when time is of 
the essence and the 1MAW, MAG, and squadron commanders collectively want—
ignoring cost—parts, and hence increased readiness, “at all costs.” 
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Given the affect that customs delays has on the overall cost of shipping parts 
commercially, this section conducts a sensitivity analysis of the impact decreased 
customs delays have on overall shipping costs. The following figures and tables show 
how a one-day reduction in custom delays would affect commercial shipping cost for 
each of the four exercises involved. Further, projections are made for a scenario without 






Figure 29.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger TAD Costs With Decreased Customs Delays 
 




Figure 30.  Cobra Gold/Cope Tiger Commercial Shipping Costs Without Customs Delays 




With the one-day reduction in customs delays, the three-year average TAD costs 
for shipping commercially to the Thailand exercises is decreased from $245,933 to 
$145,784, which is a 40% reduction. Furthermore, the average total cost to ship 
commercially without any customs delays is $58,763, which demonstrates that the 








Figure 31.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier TAD Costs With Decreased Customs 
Delays 





Figure 32.  Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier Commercial Shipping Costs Without 
Customs Delays 
Table 32.   Talisman Saber/Southern Frontier Commercial Shipping Costs Without 
Customs Delays 
 
The Australian exercises prove to have similar reductions as those of the Thai 
exercises. By reducing customs delays by one day, average commercial TAD shipping 
costs decrease from $1,521,514 to $402,278 which is a 74% reduction. Eliminating 
customs delays entirely leads to average total commercial shipping costs of $1,003,618 








Figure 33.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX TAD Costs With Decreased Customs Delays 




Figure 34.  Balikatan/PHIBLEX Commercial Shipping Costs Without Customs Delays 
Table 34.   Balikatan/PHIBLEX Commercial Shipping Costs Without Customs Delays 
 
The Filipino exercises proves no different again with similar reductions in costs. 
The three year average TAD costs for commercially shipped parts fall from $221,767 to 
$147,631 which is a 33% reduction. Total average commercial shipping costs of $75,513 










Figure 35.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle TAD Costs With Decreased Customs 
Delays 





Figure 36.  Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle Commercial Shipping Costs Without 
Customs Delays 
Table 36.   Osan Turn Det/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle Commercial Shipping Costs 
Without Customs Delays 
 
Finally, the South Korean exercises follow suit with the other exercise but shows 
less significant reductions by reducing customs delays. With the one-day reduction in 
customs delays, TAD costs for commercially shipped parts fall from an average of 
$24,037 to an average of $24,003 which is less than a 1% reduction. Total average 
shipping costs without customs delays are $47,747. 
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E. RISK ANALYSIS 
The risks of commercial shipping costs mainly lie in two areas: variance in 
customs delays and the potential variation in the size of operations within the PACOM 
AOR. The former is shown through the analysis of the data presented thus far in this 
research while the latter is less tangible, but still important to mention. 
The effects of customs delays are readily apparent from the sensitivity analysis in 
the previous section. Furthermore, the variance in customs delays also leads to the 
majority of variance in the overall costs of shipping parts commercially. As such, the true 
risk in the commercial shipping costs lies in the variance of the customs delays. 
Controlling this variance would lead to more controlled commercial shipping costs as 
well as reduce the overall costs entirely. 
It is worth noting that the breadth of the data presented in this research is 
relatively small compared to potential large-scale combat operations in the PACOM 
AOR. While this research looks at only one type of aircraft and only short exercises 
(seven to 14 days in duration), it is easily imaginable how the costs due to customs delays 
could quickly grow given the full spectrum of DoD aircraft during sustained combat 
operations. It is also not fully understood how the various countries’ customs departments 
might respond to large increases in workload and throughput. 
There are several other factors that could impact the costs of both commercial and 
MilAir shipping costs. Variables such as fuel prices, TAD rates, and O&M costs of KC-
130 operations could also affect overall shipping costs. However, the intent of this 
research was to focus on the effects of customs delays, and the other factors, as 
mentioned previously, fall outside the scope of this study. 
 81
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results presentation is the final stage of the BCA and the topic of this final 
chapter. In this step, the study communicates the results of the analysis. Conclusions are 
constructed around the objectives of the analysis that were stated throughout Chapters V–
VII. This study uses figures and tables to communicate the results of all quantitative data 
along with a narrative description to ensure that the results are easily interpreted. Any 
unexpected results, outliers, or easily misinterpreted results are also discussed. Finally, 
this chapter identifies a recommended course of action and states support for that 
recommendation to bring closure to the analysis (DAU, 2011). 
A. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
In this study, using a BCA methodology, the assumption is confirmed that 
commercial shipment in the USPACOM AOR has the potential to be a more economical 
means of shipment, if not for customs delays. Although it was also further confirmed that 
MilAir can be the more effective means of shipment (from a TRR standpoint), there are 
also limitations and extreme fiscal consequences to this form of shipping. Due to the 
current global recession and the extremely high O&M costs of refueling/tactical support 
MilAir aircraft, it has become a strategic imperative that the U.S. DoS and DoD create 
initiatives that apply appropriate incentives on foreign customs departments in a more 
diligent attempt to ease the bottleneck realized each time a U.S. asset is inducted for 
processing by host-nation personnel. 
B. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF COMMERCIAL SHIPMENT 
This study shows that commercial shipping options are the most cost-efficient 
method to ship aircraft parts to any allied country in USPACOM. These efficiencies can 
only be realized, however, if the customs delays are held to a minimum. The logistics 
businesses such as DHL and FedEx operate with such high efficiencies making it 
reasonable to conclude that it would contribute to significant cost savings for the military. 
These advantages would prove to be even more important given any large-scale  
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operations in the USPACOM AOR. However, the speed and price will continue to be 
compromised, negated, and remain a secondary option, until customs TAT is improved 
upon in all host nations. 
C. SOURCE OF SECOND THOUGHTS: VULNERABILITIES OF 
COMMERCIAL SHIPMENT 
There are serious problems overseas in the DoD’s overall management structure 
and foreign joint relationships, including the seemingly endless quest for auditability of 
all agencies from the top, down. The logistics support organizations, doctrine, and 
procedures for MALS-12 in the Marine Corps, and other USPACOM units, presuppose a 
challenging degree of complexity and the almost inevitable conflicting objectives 
associated with supporting operational units in a deployed joint and combined 
environment. The subtleties of cooperation within the different Thai government 
organizations—from the RTAF to GSO to customs—are at the forefront of the challenge. 
Host-nation customs arrangements are the most common complaint among U.S. forces 
and are a result of outdated or unenforced SOFAs, or ambivalence from senior levels in 
the DoD/DoS toward seriously approaching the host nation about the necessity for 
improvement, and a collective vested interest to increase readiness for optimal security in 
the region. Some recent progress has been made in this area, but as aircraft parts 
transportation or supply has become increasingly outsourced, the problem has worsened, 
and long clearance delays in peacetime make one wonder about how any real increase in 
the level of operations could be meaningfully sustained. 
While the use of local nationals in our embassies is not in itself objectionable, this 
common cost-saving measure means that DoS personnel must exercise much closer 
supervision than they would over U.S. staff. It is questionable how often this would 
actually happen in an embassy like Bangkok or Manila, where customs clearance is does 
not have a priority among hundreds of other matters of higher priority. In that context, the 
Log Cell staff becomes the main facilitator, and an all-too-small organization must be a 
very frustrating and stressful place to work. Additionally, U.S. Embassy GSO operations 
need to meet a minimum standard coordinated with other U.S. agencies, even if there are 
inevitable variations due to host-nation practices. As an example, Australia is a very close 
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ally and is one in particular that could potentially loosen customs practices as it regularly 
hosts large rotations of U.S. forces as well as a small permanent footprint of facilities, 
equipment, and supplies. Australia is also an advanced, sophisticated Western nation that 
has a major stake in world trade. Hopefully, the adaptability characteristic of the ADF 
will soon reach its colleagues in the ACB. Perhaps a blanket exemption from customs 
procedures is required for every country in which the United States has a significant 
presence. Implementing these reforms in national law would require more sophistication 
on the DoD side in terms of advance shipping notices to the host nation, but could be 
accomplished through diligent, persistent, and effective negotiation by the DoS, with the 
DoD in a close, supporting technical role. 
It is difficult to grasp the significance of the pivot to Asia in the face of—as we 
allude to—the most dense, tangled, disproportionate spider web cloaking the USPACOM 
AOR. As in so many other major decisions, logistics considerations need to be fully 
integrated into the deployment of forces and into changes in military strategy in the very 
near future. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
There are several recommended follow-on studies that would be relevant in 
understanding and influencing change of the current commercial and military logistics 
processes, as well as host-nation customs policies. First, research could be conducted on 
the labor force in each host country specific to the number of people that work and 
influence item processing in a customs department and/or JUSMAG. Coming to a deeper 
understanding of the internal processes and personnel numbers within each joint or host-
country agency may be immense in assisting in the “leaning out” of traditional or culture-
specific antiquated and very cumbersome foreign business practices. Ultimately, if 10 
people in the near future could more effectively do the job of the 20 who currently are 
operating at status quo, then there must be a business culture mindset shift in order for 
total TAT to occur. The United States might focus on influence strategies that achieve 
this end—assisting by all means in the development of a foreign business model for  
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organizations such as JUSMAGs, GSOs, and other customs offices in order to garner 
vested interest in U.S. force readiness and, in the end, to resolve the current customs 
bottleneck that exists in each host country. 
We noted in our analysis of flight records that almost none of KC-130 flights that 
supported the various exercises carried their full capacity of cargo. This fact led to a 
higher per pound cost of the cargo transported and is an area that may warrant further 
research. Perhaps some sort of optimization that balances total cargo loads to TRR delays 
caused by waiting for full or nearly full cargo loads could be beneficial for achieving 
more economical MilAir shipping. 
Another potentially beneficial study would be to look back at how U.S. forces 
operated logistically in the region to support and sustain the Vietnam War. Although 
much has changed over the past 40 years since the end of the war, there may be concepts 
and agreements applied back then that may still be applicable and beneficial today in 
negotiating new contracts with other Asian countries. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Complex challenges will always persist in the world of logistics, especially on the 
international scene. The United States, either independently or in concert with its closest 
allies, may not be able to continue supporting annual exercises or a conflict in the 
USPACOM region while experiencing inefficiencies. There must be at all times an 
elevated degree of teamwork and diligence applied to the problem of logistics throughput 
in to the countries of our allies in order to support future operations and/or exercises. 
Money does not solve all of the problems, but this study successfully determines 
significant cost savings in the millions, and increased joint force readiness, if the customs 
barriers are breached and restructured to best suit optimal joint readiness and economic 
responsibility in the current recession. The USMC KC-130J troop transport and refueling 
aircraft should still play a vital role in the USPACOM region in the transport of all items 
it is suited to carry, but as was proven in this study, millions of dollars can be saved if the 
commercial agencies were relied more heavily while added pressure is applied 
concurrently to the allied customs departments. Most, or part, of all the funding saved on 
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the O&M costs to operate a KC-130J, could be diverted to foreign country customs 
departments to help influence throughput, and in turn money is still saved, and a vital 
resource – the KC-130J – is freed-up to conduct other more important missions than the 
transport of aircraft parts, or other U.S. assets. 
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